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THE GOVERNMENT-ACTION REQUIREMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTFUTIONAL LAW
Russell W. Galloway*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most constitutional limits apply only to the govern-
ment.' Unreasonable searches and seizures by private parties
do not violate the fourth amendment.2 Deprivations of life,
liberty, or property by private parties are not subject to the
due process clauses.3 Private parties may abridge free speech
without violating the first amendment4 and may discriminate
against racial minorities without violating the equal protec-
tion clause.' With two exceptions, constitutional claims are
valid only if the harm was caused by government action."
© 1990 by Russell W. Galloway.
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Projcct; member of
the California bar.
1. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) ("most rights
secured by the Constitution are protected only against infiingement by govern-
ments"). "With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, the guarantees of the
Constitution run only against national and state governments." J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 344 (1986). Actually, there is a
second exception, as the ensuing discussion explains.
2. "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an
arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative." Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411 (1989).
3. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects individuals only from governmental
and not from private action." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930
(1982).
4. E.g., 1-ludgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
5. E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
6. The government-action requirement is often referred to as the "state ac-
tion" requirement. "Government action" is a more apt term, however, for two
reasons. First, the requirement may be satisfied by federal government action as
well as state government action. " '[S]tate action' is a misnomer as the issue arises
in an identical manner when the federal government or its agents are involved in
a case." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LkW 498 (1983).
Second, the requirement may be satisfied by action of counties, municipalities, and
other local government entities such as special districts. All such branches of local
govermnent are considered agencies of the State.
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Government action, in short, is a standard preliminary
requirement in constitutional cases.7 This article describes
the structure of government-action analysis as set forth in Su-
preme Court cases. Its purpose is to help law students and
lawyers understand and apply the several strands of Supreme
Court law in this often confusing field.
The major principles of government-action law are sum-
marized in the following outline.
Government-Action Requirement: Basic Analysis
A. Applicability
1. General rule: constitutional claimants must prove
that government action was present.
2. Exceptions
a. Thirteenth amendment
b. Certain privileges of United States citizens, such
as the privilege to use public roads
B. Compliance
1. Action by government official
a. General rule: action by a government official is
government action.
b. Exception: action unrelated to the official's
government duties
2. Joint action by government official and private party
a.. General rule: action by private party is govern-
ment action when undertaken jointly with gov-
ernment official.
b. Exception: scope unclear
3. Action by private party
a. General rule: action by a private party is not
government action.
b. Exceptions
1) Where the private party is performing a
public function
2) Where a sufficient nexus (connection) exists
between the government and the private
party's conduct
7. See Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775
(1980).
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a) Compulsion: when the government
compels the private conduct, the con-
duct is government action.
b) Encouragement: when the government
substantially encourages the private
conduct, the conduct may be govern-
ment action.
c) Entanglement/symbiotic relationship:
when the government and the private
party are entangled so that each profits
from the other's involvement, the pri-
vate conduct may be government ac-
tion.
Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seek-
ing redress for an alleged violation of the United States Con-
stitution must show, as a preliminary matter, that the
government-action requirement is either inapplicable or satis-
fied. Government-action analysis proceeds in two steps. One
must determine, first, whether the government-action require-
ment is applicable. If so, one must determine, second, wheth-
er the requirement is satisfied.
Applicability. As a general rule, constitutional limits apply
only to the government, so a claimant seeking relief for a
constitutional violation must show that the harm resulted
from government action. Only two exceptions exist. First, the
thirteenth amendment applies to private as well as govern-
ment action. Second, certain privileges of federal citizens,
such as the privilege to use public roads, are protected
against private infringement.
Compliance. If the government-action requirement is ap-
plicable, claimant must show that the harm alleged was, in
fact, the result of government action. Such cases fall into
three categories, involving 1) conduct by government offi-
cials, 2) joint government and private conduct, and 3) con-
1990] 937
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duct by private parties.' These categories are covered by
different rules.
Conduct by a government official is government action
unless the conduct is not related to the official's government
duties. The general rule, in other words, is that conduct by a
government official is government action. The exception is
conduct unrelated to the official's government duties.
Similarly, conduct by a private party is government ac-
tion if it is undertaken jointly with a government official.
Presumably there are exceptions, but the Supreme Court has
not spelled them out in detail. Indeed, the joint-participation
rule may be limited to cases involving use of state-created
attachment procedures.
In contrast, conduct solely by a private party who is not
a government official is not government action unless it is a
"public function" or a sufficient "nexus" (connection) exists
between the government and the conduct. The general rule,
in other words, is that such conduct is not government ac-
tion. But there are two exceptions. First, where the conduct
is a public function, government action is present. Second,
where the government has a sufficient nexus with the con-
duct so that the government may justifiably be considered
responsible for the conduct, government action is present.
A sufficient nexus may be shown in several ways. First, if
the government compelled the conduct, a sufficient nexus is
present, and the conduct is government action. Second, if
the government substantially encouraged the conduct, a suffi-
cient nexus may be found. Third, where a symbiotic relation-
ship exists between the government and the private actor so
that each profits from the other's involvement, the entangle-
ment may be a sufficient nexus, although this is not as clear-
ly settled as the exceptions based on government compulsion
and encouragement.
The next section discusses each step of government-
action analysis in more detail.
8. "[T]he party charged . . . must be a person who may fairly be said to be
a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted to-
gether with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his con-
duct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982).
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II. DISCUSSION
In every constitutional case, one should consider the
government-action issue. One should determine, first, wheth-
er the government-action requirement is applicable. If so,
one should determine, second, whether the requirement is
met.
A. Is the Government-Action Requirement Applicable?
1. General Rule
The government-action requirement is, as a general rule,
applicable to constitutional claims, because most constitution-
al limits apply only to the government.' Therefore, if one is
pursuing a constitutional claim, it should be assumed that
the government-action requirement must be satisfied, unless
an exception is present.
2. Exceptions
The Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions
to the general rule that constitutional claimants must satisfy
the government-action requirement.
First, the thirteenth amendment" applies to private
conduct as well as government action." Thus, a claimant
who alleges that he/she has been subjected to slavery, or
involuntary servitude need not prove that government action
was involved.
Second, the Court has stated that the privilege of United
States citizens to use public roads is protected against private
as well as governmental infringement. 2 This rule may ex-
tend to other, similar privileges of United States citizens as
well.
If one of these two exceptions is applicable, the govern-
ment-action requirement does not apply, and one may pro-
ceed to analyze other components of the constitutional claim.
If, on the other hand, neither of these exceptions is applica-
9. See supra note 1.
10. The amendment provides, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ...
shall exist within the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
11. Jones v. Alfred t1. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
12. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 765 (1966).
1990]
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ble, the government-action requirement does apply, and one
must analyze whether the requirement is met.
B. Is the Government-Action Requirement Satisfied?
If the government-action requirement is applicable,
claimant must show that it is met. The controlling rules vary
depending on whether the conduct that caused claimant's
harm was performed solely by a government official, jointly
by a government official and a private party, or solely by a
private party.
1. Conduct by Government Officials
a. General Rule
Conduct by a government official is, as a general rule,
government action, if it is related to the official's governmen-
tal duties."3 Thus, the government-action requirement is pre-
sumptively satisfied if the conduct that harmed the claimant
was performed by a government official, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial.' 4 This is true even if the official's con-
duct was ultra vires, i.e., contrary to legal restrictions.15
b. Exception
Conduct by a government official is not government
action, however, if the conduct is performed in a purely pri-
vate capacity and is unrelated to the actor's duties as a gov-
13. E.g., West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988) ("[S]tate enployment is
generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor.") quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982).
14. "When a legislature, executive officer, or a court takes some official
action against an individual, that action is subject to review under tile Constitu-
tion, for the official act of any governmental agency is direct governmental action
and is therefore subject to the restraints of the Constitution." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 421. "State action . . . may emanate from
rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from legislative or
judicial action." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972). "That
the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be
regarded as action of the State . . . . is a proposition which has long been estab-
lished by decisions of this Court . . . . State action . . . refers to exertions of
state power in all forms." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
15. "[T]he actions of a state officer who exceeds the limits of his authority
constitute state action." Lugar; 457 U.S. at 929. "It is clear that the acts of offi-
cials, federal or state, even if the acts violate the law, constitute 'state action.'" J.
BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 1, at 349.
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ernment official. For example, if a sheriff hits a pedestrian
while driving the family car to the store to buy family grocer-
ies, that is not government action. Similarly, a police officer
searching his/her child's room to collect dirty clothes for the
wash is not engaged in government action.
2. Conduct Involving Joint Participation by Government
Officials and Private Parties
Conduct undertaken jointly by government officials and
private parties may be government action, but the scope of
this rule is unclear. The leading recent case is Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Company, 1" which held that attachment pro-
ceedings initiated by a private creditor were governinent ac-
tion, where the writ of attachment was issued by a state clerk
and executed by the sheriff.' 7
It is unclear how broadly the joint-participation rule
sweeps. Lugar suggests two possible limits. First, the rule may
only apply where "the claimed deprivation has resulted from
the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority."" In Lugar, for example, claimant "invok[ed] the
aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attach-
ment procedures." 9 Second, the rule may apply only to pre-
judgment attachments." If the latter limit is good law, the
exception nearly swallows the rule, and it may not make
sense to call the joint-participation doctrine a "general rule."
3. Conduct by Private Parties
The most troublesome government-action issues arise
when the conduct that harmed claimant was performed by a
private party, i.e., a person or entity not involved in an agen-
cy relationship with the government or acting jointly with a
government official. The general rule is that such conduct is
16. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
17. Justice White's opinion for the Court stated, "[W]e have consistently held
that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disput-
ed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 941.
18. Id. at 939.
19. Id. at 942.
20. As tlhe Lugar majority put it, "TIhe holding today . . . is limited to the
particular context of prejudgment attachment." Id. at 939 n.21.
1990]
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not government action, and the major issues concern the
scope of the exceptions.
a. General Rule
Conduct by a private party, i.e., a party who is not a
government official, is not, as a general rule, government ac-
tion." Thus, if the government-action requirement is appli-
cable and the conduct that harmed claimant was performed
by a private party, the claim must be dismissed unless an
exception is present.
b. Exceptions
The main issue in government-action law is when con-
duct by a private party is government action, i.e., "What
must be shown to subject seemingly private actors to the
constitutional guarantees ordinarily applicable only to govern-
ment?"22 This issue has spawned many famous and complex
Supreme Court cases, but the decisions holding conduct by
private parties to be government action fall into two main
categories which comprise the two exceptions to the rule that
conduct by private parties is not government action. These
exceptions have been labelled the "public function" and "nex-
us" exceptions.
23
1) Public Function Exception
Conduct by a private party is government action if it is a
"public function."24 A public function is a function tradi-
21. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
22. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL lAw 866 (1985).
23. Id. at 866-67:
That search for indicia of state action follows two distinguishable
routes. One may be called the 'nexus' approach: it seeks to identify
sufficient points of contact between the private actor and the state to
justify imposing constitutional restraints on the private actor ....
The alternative to that 'nexus' analysis is the 'public function' ap-
proach. Instead of searching for formal contacts between the state
and the private [actor], it focuses ois the nature of the activity the
private [actor] engages in.
24. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975); Amalgamated Food Employees Union
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
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tionally exclusively reserved to the government.2 5 The public
function exception is not favored,2 6 and this restrictive defi-
nition is applied strictly to keep the exception within "care-
fully confined bounds."
27
The scope of the public function doctrine is uncertain.
Only two kinds of conduct have been definitively identified
as public functions: running towns2s and conducting elec-
tions of public officials.29 The Warren Court held that run-
ning a shopping center is a public function,"0 but the Bur-
ger Court overruled the decision,"' so running a shopping
center is not a public function. Similarly, the Warren Court
once declared that running a public park is a public func-
tion, 2 but the Burger Court later repudiated the state-
ment.3" Chief Justice Rehnquist has suggested that condem-
nation of property pursuant to the eminent domain power is
a public function. 4 And Justice Stevens has suggested that
"maintenance of a police force is a unique sovereign func-
tion," although this is doubtful in light of the past and
present existence of private police forces such as Pinkerton
guards, company police, and private neighborhood patrols.
To determine whether conduct is a public function, one
must apply the Jackson-Flagg Brothers test that focuses on
whether the conduct is traditionally exclusively reserved to
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1941).
25. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158 ("functions ... 'exclusively reserved to the
state."'); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 ("powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State"). Accord Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
26. "[Tjhe modern Court does not look with favor upon efforts to expand
the 'public function' analysis . . . ." G. GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 871.
27. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163.
28. Marsh, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), holding that the private owner of a company
town may not ban distribution of religious literature. Matsh only applies, however,
"when privately owned property is the 'functional equivalent' of a municipality."
J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 1, at 351.
29. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), holding that a state party conven-
tion may not ban black persons from voting in primary elections. Cf Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
30. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
31. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
32. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966).
33. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161 n.l (1978).
34. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
35. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 172 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1990]
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the-government. Obviously, this requires examining the histo-
ry of the particular conduct to see whether it has sometimes
been performed in the past by private parties. Thus, for
example, making an arrest is presumably not a public func-
tion, because citizens' arrests have long been authorized. On
the other hand, operating the private, corporate prisons that
have emerged in recent years may be a public function, since
incarceration of duly charged or convicted criminals has tra-
ditionally been an exclusive government function.
In deciding whether the Court is likely to recognize new
categories of public function, one should bear in mind the
Court's hostility toward the public function doctrine."6 This
hostility is demonstrated by the Burger Court's two leading
public function cases. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Compa-
ny,3 7 the Court held that supplying gas and electricity to the
public is not a public function although governments often
choose to provide these services and the utility had a stat-
utory monopoly and was heavily regulated. In Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks,"8 the Court held that the forced sale of
stored goods pursuant to a statutory warehouseman's lien is
not a public function, even though three Justices concluded
that nonconsensual transfers of title have traditionally been
reserved exclusively to the government. "Thus, it would ap-
pear that few public functions will be found beyond those
most essential services which are provided by governments
and which have no direct counterpart in the private sec-
tor." 9
If the conduct that harmed claimant is a "public func-
tion," the government-action requirement is met even though
the actor is ostensibly a private party.
2) Nexus Exception
Conduct by a private party will also satisfy the govern-
ment-action requirement if there is a sufficient nexus (con-
nection) between the government and the private conduct to
36. "While the Burger Court continues to accept the public function theory
of state action, its doctrinal scope has been severely restricted." J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, supra note 1, at 352.
37. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
38. 436 U.S. 147 (1978).
39. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 506.
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justify the conclusion that the government is responsible for
the private party's decision to engage in the conduct. ° This
is the second exception to the general rule that conduct by
private parties is not government action. The nexus excep-
tion has at least two and perhaps three strands: government
compulsion, government encouragement, and perhaps gov-
ernment entanglement (symbiotic relationship).
In each case, the required nexus must be shown between
the government and the precise conduct which claimant al-
leges to be unconstitutional.4" At one time, the Court
seemed to believe that multiple contacts between the govern-
ment and the private party would suffice even if the govern-
ment did not compel or encourage the specific conduct that
harmed claimant,42 and several Justices believe this should
still be the law.43 But the majority has made it clear that
general government involvement in the affairs of the private
actor is not enough and that the claimant seeking to invoke
this exception must demonstrate a government nexus with
the precise conduct challenged.44
a) Private Conduct Compelled by the Government Is
Government Action.
Government compulsion of conduct by a private party is
a sufficient nexus to make that conduct government ac-
tion. 5 The compulsion may arise from several sources. Pri-
40. "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Jackson, 419 U.S. at
351. "[C]onstitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the
State is responsible for the specific conduct of which tie plaintiff complains." Blum
v. Yarctsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). "Our cases have accordingly insisted that
the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation . . . be fairly attributable to the
State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
41. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 ("close nexus between the State and the
challenged action"); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 ("sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action"); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. ivis, 407 U.S. 163,
173, 176-77 (1972).
42. The best example is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1013, in which Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the test should be the
government's "involvement in the total context of the action taken."
44. See authorities cited in supra note 41. The first case that made this doc-
trine clear was Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
45. "Our cases state 'that a State is responsible for [the] act of a private
1990] 945
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vate conduct required by legislation (statute, ordinance, regu-
lation) is government action." Similarly, private conduct re-
quired by court order is government action.47 And private
conduct compelled by threats of retaliation by executive offi-
cials is government action.' This strand of the nexus excep-
tion is well settled and has not been questioned by the cur-
rent Court.
b) Private Conduct Substantially Encouraged by the
Government May Be Government Action.
Government encouragement of conduct by a private
party may also provide a sufficient nexus to make that con-
duct government action. No precise formula exists for de-
termining when government encouragement is sufficient to
support the conclusion that conduct by a private party is
government action; one must weigh all the facts and circum-
stances." But the current Court has been strict in requiring
encouragement so substantial that the government must be
deemed responsible for the private decision to undertake the
action in question.
The nadir of the encouragement theory was Flagg Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Brooks,5" in which the private conduct was a
warehouseman's sale of stored goods pursuant to a statute
explicitly authorizing the sale and defining the specific proce-
dures to be followed. Although the statute no doubt substan-
party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.'" Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
46. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411
(1989) (federal regulation requiring private railroads to give their employees drug
tests); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (local ordinance requir-
ing segregation of restaurants). "When state legislation conmands a certain activi-
ty . . . , there is no question but that state action is present whenever someone
follows the guidelines of the statute." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 6, at 508.
47. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court order enforcing restrictive
covenant is state action), is often cited as the leading case on this point, but
Shelley may be a "government official" case rather than a "nexus-compulsion" case.
48. E.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
49. E.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-12. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), has been called the "high point of this 'encouragement approach' to state
action." J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 1, at 357.
50. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411; Reitman, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf. Burton v.
Wilhington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
51. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
946 [Vol. 30
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tially encouraged the sale, the Court held the nexus excep-
tion inapplicable. After Flagg Brothers, it appeared that the
encouragement doctrine might be moribund," but the
Court later indicated that government encouragement of
private conduct may still be enough to satisfy the govern-
ment-action requirement.53 Flagg Brothers and other cases
make clear, however, that the encouragement must be very
significant.54
Earlier cases suggested that government authorization,
approval, or even passive acquiescence might be a sufficient
nexus so that private conduct satisfies the government-action
requirement,55 but these dicta have been emphatically reject-
ed by the current Court.5"
c) Private Conduct with Which the Government Is
Entangled in a Symbiotic Relationship May Be Government Action,
Although This Is Not Clear.
Decisions issued by the liberal-activist Court of the
1960's suggested that conduct by a private party is govern-
ment action if the government is significantly entangled in
the conduct, even though the government neither compelled
nor encouraged the conduct.5 7 This doctrine appeared mori-
52. "Increasingly, 'encouragement' of private action is giving way to a re-
quirement that the state 'command' the particular decision or action being chal-
lenged." J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 1, at 356. "Despite the far-reaching
statements about 'authorization' and 'encouragement' in the cases of the 1960s,
the modern Court has refused to apply these concepts broadly." G. GUNTHER,
supra note 22, at 894.
53. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982): "[A State] normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised a coercive pow-
er or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that tie
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Acconfi Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
54. Another case that makes this clear is Blum, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), which
held that decisions to transfer patients out of private nursing homes are not gov-
ernment action even though the government wrote the rules for such transfers
and imposed monetary sanctions on nursing homes for failure to comply with tie
rules.
55. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
56. "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is
not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible . . . ." Blum, 457 U.S. at
1004. Cf. Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), which held that execu-
tion of a warehouseman's lien was not government action despite statutory autho-
rization.
57. The classic example is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
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bund after Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 8 which
held that conduct by a privately owned public utility was not
government action despite numerous entanglements with the
government.59 But Jackson did suggest that entanglement
that takes the form of a "symbiotic relationship," i.e., a rela-
tionship in which the government profits from the chal-
lenged private conduct and the private party profits from the
government's involvement, might still be enough to provide
the requisite nexus. ° And the Burger Court referred to the
symbiotic relationship concept with apparent approval in
several other cases.
6
'
So perhaps the entanglement strand of the nexus excep-
tion is still alive if claimant can show that the government is
symbiotically entangled in the specific conduct challenged.
On the other hand, it may be that evidence of a symbiotic
relationship in which the government profits from the chal-
lenged private conduct is more accurately viewed as proof of
government encouragement and that the entanglement
strand no longer has independent status.
III. CONCLUSION
The government-action requirement is a standard ingre-
dient of constitutional analysis. Since nearly all constitutional
limits apply only to the government, constitutional claimants
must normally show that the harm of which they complain
was caused by government action. Government-action analysis
proceeds in two steps.
First, one must determine whether the government-
action requirement is applicable. The requirement is applica-
ble in all constitutional cases except those based on the thir-
teenth amendment and certain privileges of United States
(1961) (refusal by private retaurant in public parking authority to serve blacks is
government action).
58. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
59. Cf Blurn v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), which stated, "[The gov-
ernment] normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."
60. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357: "We also find absent in the instant case tile
symbiotic relationship presented in Buton . .. ."
61. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982); CBS, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
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citizens, including the privilege to use public roads. If one of
these exceptions is applicable, government action is not re-
quired. In all other constitutional cases, the government-
action requirement must be satisfied by claimant.
Second, if the requirement is applicable, one must deter-
mine whether it is met, i.e., whether the claimant's harm was
caused by government action. If the conduct causing the
harm was performed solely by a government official, it is
government action unless it was wholly unrelated to the
official's government duties. If the conduct was performed
jointly by a government official and a private party, it may
be government action, although the scope of this rule is
unclear. If the conduct was performed by a private party,
government action is not present unless the conduct was a
public function or there was a sufficient nexus between the
government and the private conduct in the form of govern-
ment compulsion, encouragement, or perhaps symbiotic en-
tanglement.
If the government-action requirement either is not appli-
cable or is satisfied, the constitutional analysis may proceed
to other issues, including the merits of the constitutional
claim. If on the other hand, the government-action require-
ment is applicable and not satisfied, the constitutional claim
should be dismissed without reaching the merits.
The current Court is extremely strict in enforcing the
government-action requirement, and one should expect that
claimant will lose in most close cases, at least those involving
activity by a private party.
1990]

